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In this paper, I present a very interesting observation about identity in fiction. I call it the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability.
After arguing that the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability holds in the dream context, the fictional context in a narrow sense, and the fictional context in an extended sense, I show one application of the phenomenon in defending Kendall Walton against Fred Kroon's objections to him. Here is what she said:
First dream: (1) I was standing, and I saw there was me in front of me, looking at me (it was me!). She approached me and touched my left cheek with her right hand.
Second dream: (2) I was standing, and I saw there was me in front of me, looking at me (it was me!). I approached her and touched her left cheek with my right hand.
Since 'I' and 'She' in both statements refer to the same person, M, if we replace them by 'M' in these statements, both of them will look as follows: (3) is misleading in the sense that it describes two dreams as the same while they are in fact different. To make this difference clear, we need to index the names as follows:
(1) * at Ned. If we describe these situations, we will have the following:
(7) Ned sees him following him and Ned laughs at him.
(8) Ned sees him following him and he laughs at Ned.
Since 'he' in both statements refers to the same person, Ned, if we replace them by 'Ned' in these statements, both of them will look as follows:
(9) Ned sees Ned following Ned and Ned laughs at Ned. Now statement (9) is misleading in the sense that it describes two instances as the same while they are in fact different. To avoid this, we need to index the names as follows: description of an actual detective called 'Sherlock Holmes' and it is also fictional that the actual detective Sherlock Holmes is in fact brilliant. In the second example, it is fictional that we are seeing people who are dancing around the fire.
We can see that not only does the fiction itself create the fictional Let's apply this account to the above situations. Clinton is engaging in a game of make-believe with the statue. Since the statue represents Clinton, Clinton makes-believe that he touches Clinton in the first situation. In the first situation, it is fictional that (10) Clinton touches
Clinton. In the second situation, Clinton makes-believe that Clinton touches him. In the second situation, it is fictional that (11) Clinton touches Clinton.
Statement (10) and statement (11) say exactly the same thing while two situations are different. In order to distinguish between them, we need to index the names.
(10) * Clinton 1 touches Clinton 2 .
(11) * Clinton 2 touches Clinton 1 .
'Clinton 1 ' and 'Clinton 2 ' refer to the same person, Clinton. That is, Clinton 1 ＝Clinton 2 . But we cannot use these names interchangeably in this context. 'Identity without interchangeability' holds in the fictional context in an extended sense.
To sum up the discussion in this section, the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability holds in the fictional context in a narrow sense, and we have seen this with statement (7) * and (8)
*
. This phenomenon also holds in the fictional context in an extended sense, and we have just seen this with statement (10) * and (11) * .
There is one thing to note here. In the dream context, the fictional context in a narrow sense, and the fictional context in an extended sense, the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability holds, whether names are empty or not. The first puzzle is this: In reality, P is Q, but P is described in a fiction that not-Q. So we get contradiction that P is Q, and P is not-Q. For example, Clinton is in reality quite handsome. But suppose that the statue of him in the example mentioned in section 3 represents him as not so handsome. Then, according to Kroon, if we apply Walton's account of 4) Fred Kroon (1994a) , "Make-Believe and Fictional Reference", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol.52, pp.207-214; Fred Kroon (1994b) fiction, we get the contradiction that Clinton is handsome and Clinton is not so handsome.
The second puzzle is this: S is engaging in the game of make-believe with a fiction in which S is described to have a certain attitude R towards himself. S, learning this, has the attitude toward S that is opposite to R.
So we get the contradiction that S has the opposite-to-R-attitude towards S because S has the attitude R towards himself. For example, Tom is watching a movie about himself. In the movie, he is described as ruining his life with a certain unhealthy obsession, and everyone except Tom Let's consider the first puzzle. Note that what we get from the example is not that it is true that Clinton is handsome and Clinton is not so handsome, but that it is fictional (it is true in a game of make-believe)
that Clinton is handsome and Clinton is not so handsome. That is, the (12) Clinton is handsome and Clinton is not so handsome.
If we disambiguate it, we get the following:
(12) * Clinton 1 is handsome and Clinton 2 is not so handsome.
'Clinton 1 ' and 'Clinton 2 ' refer to the same person, Clinton. But once statement (12) is disambiguated and we get statement (12) * where we can distinguish between Clinton 1 and Clinton 2 , there is nothing contradictory about it, because we are talking about the fictional context in which the phenomenon of identity without interchangeability holds. 6) , 7) 6) One reviewer raised the following worry. According to my account, in this fictional context, both "Clinton 1 ＝Clinton 2 " and "Clinton 1 ≠ Clinton 2 " seem true. Then, my account does not get rid of a contradiction. Instead, it reintroduces another contradiction. This is an excellent point and it is indeed a legitimate worry. I would like to claim that "Clinton 1 ＝Clinton 2 " is true in this context, because, as I have explained above, both of them refer to the same person, Clinton. Philosophers such as Walton accept (or at least are committed to) this kind of identity, so it is not just me who claim so. However, I would like to deny that "Clinton 1 ≠Clinton 2 " is true in this context, for the same reason why "Clinton 1 ＝Clinton 2 " is true in this context. To the objection that the same person cannot be placed at two different places at the same time, I would like to respond that it is a fictional context that we are talking about (see section 2 above), and to the objection that Clinton 1 and Clinton 2 have different properties, I would like to respond that although I had different properties at age 5 than I had at age 30, I as a person at age 30 am still the same person as me at age 5. That is, it does not follow from the fact that they have different properties that they are distinct. Therefore, my account does not introduce another contradiction. 7) One reviewer raised the following worry. Perhaps there is a no reference involved in the context of fiction, but only "an as-if reference" involved, and if this is the case, then "Clinton 1 ＝Clinton 2 " is not true in the fictional context. Actually, Walton Walton's account of fiction does not imply a contradiction. If we have in mind that it is the fictional context in an extended sense where the himself claims that there is no real reference involved when we are engaging in a game of make-believe, and we only pretend to refer to something. I think that this is a legitimate worry. However, according to Walton's account, even if there is only "pretending to refer," we still make-believe that we refer to something, and thus it is true in this game of make-believe that we refer to something. And as we have seen (section 3 above), according to Walton's account, when a certain proposition is true in a game of make-believe, that proposition is fictional, that is, it is true in this fictional context. Thus, it is true in the fictional context that Clinton 1 and Clinton 2 refer to the same person, and therefore "Clinton 1 ＝Clinton 2 " is true in the fictional context, even if there is no real reference but only an as-if reference involved.
phenomenon of identity without interchangeability holds, there is nothing contradictory about (12) * and (13) * . We have only the ambiguity, and once we get rid of the ambiguity, we can make perfect sense of them.
Kroon's objections to Walton fail.
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In this paper, I presented an interesting observation about identity in fiction, which I call the phenomenon of Identity without interchangeability.
I showed that this phenomenon holds in the dream context, the fictional context in a narrow sense, and the fictional context in an extended sense.
I also showed we can appeal to this phenomenon in defending Kendall
Walton against Fred Kroon's objections to him. 8) 8) I thank Stuart Brock, Eric Chwang, Brian Kierland, Sungsu Kim, and Bradley Monton for their helpful discussions and comments. I also thank anonymous referees for their kind and helpful comments. 
